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8.1 INTRODUCTION
In 2012, pro life news agency LifeNews reported:
When asked what country should be watched for upcoming pro life
initiatives . . . [Joseph Meaney, the director of Human Rights International]
replied that pro lifers should look towards Russia.
The Russian presidency and the parliament are both interested in ﬁnding
concrete solutions to limiting abortion . . . They’ve already started with
a number of measures this year, particularly making it illegal to describe
abortion as a “safe medical procedure,” and requiring those who advertise for
abortion to talk about the health risks associated with it. But I think they’re
going to move even more in the direction of outright banning of abortions for
all kinds of different reasons.1
A few months later, the US based evangelical periodicalChristianity Today
enthusiastically commented on “Europe’s top courts” supposedly “pro life
roll”:
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) upheld Austria’s ban on in
vitro fertilization in November. Weeks earlier, the European Court of Justice
ruled against destroying human embryos for scientiﬁc research.
In December 2010, the ECHR upheld Ireland’s abortion ban.
“It’s deﬁnitely a trend,” said Roger Kiska of the Alliance Defense Fund in
Slovakia. “Two or three years ago, you never would have thought that within
a year you would have three pro life [victories] in the courts.” The cases
1 “Eastern Europe Sees Growing Pro-Life Effort against Abortion,” LifeNews, October 26, 2011,
www.lifenews.com/2011/10/26/eastern-europe-sees-growing-pro-life-effort-against-abortion/
(accessed April 28, 2017).
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coming from the ECHR Europe’s equivalent of the US Supreme Court
show judicial restraint, deciding simply that abortion is not a right and
leaving its legality up to each of the Council of Europe’s forty seven member
states, Kiska said. But the Court of Justice’s ruling went a step further, ruling
that embryos are human beings. This stand was both strong and surprising, he
said. “It’s the first international court decision to say that life begins at
conception.”2
As these citations suggest, in the past three decades, political and legal
discourses over abortion have changed dramatically, both domestically and
internationally. Globalization and the rise of supranational constitutionalism
have provided a wide range of opportunities to antiabortion movements to
widen their networks, but have also brought about new challenges.
As Charmaine Yoest, the ex president of Americans United for Life and
presently the assistant secretary of the US Department for Health and
Human Services, put it: “Let’s face it, the world is getting smaller
every day,” and any new abortion right in Europe would be a “distinct threat
to American law,” because they give ammunition to domestic judges looking
for an international consensus.3
Today, pro life activists from different continents and countries cooperate
both formally and informally, unified by an agenda aimed at influencing
domestic and international lawmaking and litigation, in the sphere of religious
freedom and sexual and reproductive rights. Pro life religious organizations
have become key players in regional and international policy making fora
such as the United Nations, as well as in norm creating national and interna
tional contexts such as the European Union, and also, increasingly, in
constitutional and human rights litigation.4
This transnational dialogue has resulted in the circulation of antiabortion
arguments and strategies across different countries and legal systems. In this
chapter we showcase the parallel evolution of antiabortion arguments in
North America, Europe, and Russia. While each case has to be assessed in
own right and in the light of the specific historical, cultural, and political
factors that impact public discourses concerning reproductive rights, we
2 “Europe’s Top Courts Are on a Pro-Life Roll,” Christianity Today, January 30, 2012, www
.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/january/lifeeurope.html (accessed April 28, 2017). Note by the
authors: Austria bans the use of in-vitro fertilization on donor ovocytes or sperm.
3 Sarah Wheaton, “Anti-Abortion Groups Inspire Abroad,” Il Politico, February 5, 2014, www
.politico.com/story/2014/05/europe-anti-abortion-advocates-106285 (accessed May 20, 2017).
4 Christopher McCrudden, “Faith-Based Non-Governmental Organizations in the Public
Square,” in Malcolm Evans, Peter Petkoff, and Julian Rivers, eds., Changing Nature of
Religious Rights under International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 185–210.
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identify some surprising convergences among contemporary antiabortion dis
courses and strategies across these different contexts. These convergences not
only testify to the existence of transnational conversations amongWestern and
Russian pro life activists but also signal a new step in the global antiabortion
discourse.
As a general observation, the antiabortion discourse has undergone an
evolution from the fetus protective arguments that were prevalent in the
1970s and 1980s to the women protective arguments that emerged in the
1980s and 1990s. We argue that in connection with the rise of transnational
pro life activism, a new step in the antiabortion discourse has emerged,
namely society protective arguments, which shift the focus in the abortion
debate away from the woman and the fetus to society as a whole. The three
argumentative strategies do not succeed each other, but add up and increase
the breadth of the antiabortion discourse.
In what follows, we document the evolution of the antiabortion strategies
and rhetoric transnationally. In the unfolding of these developments from
fetus protective to society protective, we trace a shifting emphasis in the use of
conscientious objection. Whereas traditionally conscientious objection was
invoked by individuals to obtain an exemption from generally applicable laws,
in the field of reproductive rights it has become a collective instrument
designed to subvert existing laws and practices with the purpose of eliminating
reproductive rights in the name of the good of society. This evolution is
particularly salient in the context of the US culture wars. Remarkably, how
ever, this discourse has now burst well beyond the borders of the United States.
In this chapter, we showcase the transposition of the American pro life rheto
ric and strategy throughout Western Europe and Russia. Such transposition
leads to very different results. InWestern Europe, where abortion has not been
traditionally highly politicized, but where legal systems have reached long
lasting compromises over it, pro life movements seem to be influenced by
their US counterparts in a straightforward and substantially passive manner.
Courts and legislators, however, have so far not proven receptive to the new
antiabortion arguments. Russia, on the other hand, seems to be playing
a fundamental role in their spread and consolidation. While in the West
antiabortion activism dates back to the 1960s, in Russia it is a recent phenom
enon that emerged after the fall of the USSR. Thus, the language and the
strategies of US pro life movements appear prima facie to be adopted whole
sale by their Russian counterparts, who completely lack a tradition in this
domain. In the Russian adaptation, however, the meaning of the discourse is
significantly altered and supplemented. This is done by combining a society
centered collectivist approach to reproductive policies that is rooted in the
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Stalinist period with a discourse on traditional values associated with the
doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as with demographic
concerns raised by the dramatic decrease in birthrates following the fall of
the USSR. The Russian re elaboration of Western pro life arguments rein
forces the society protective case for curtailing abortion transnationally.
8.2 FROM THE CONFLICTING RIGHTS MODEL TO
WOMEN PROTECTIVE ANTIABORTION ARGUMENTS
InWestern Europe and in the United States, abortion became a constitutional
issue in the 1970s, mainly under the pressure of the feminist movements.5
Between 1973 and 1975, five landmark judicial decisions in the United States,
Germany, Italy, France, and Austria decriminalized some forms of abortion.6
These decisions framed the constitutional conflict concerning abortion in
terms of clashing rights and/or values and interests, pitting women’s right (to
life, privacy, health, and self determination) against the right of the fetus (to
life and dignity), and/or the value of pre birth life and the interest of the
government to protect it. The aforementioned abortion cases all involved
use of the proportionality principle and of judicial balancing. The Italian
decision is exemplary in this respect: “The constitutional protection of the
fetus might collide with other goods that also enjoy the protection of the
Constitution, thus, the legislator may not protect the former in absolute
terms, and deny any protection to the latter.”7 The Court balanced these
conflicting goods and concluded that “[t]here is no equivalence between the
right to life and to health of a born person, such as the mother, and the
safeguard of the embryo, that is in the process of becoming a person.”8
In the years that followed, virtually all cases decided in stabilized democratic
countries or in countries that had transitioned to democracy conformed to this
broad standard.9
Structuring abortion conflicts in terms of conflicting rights mirrored the
moral, social, and political polarization concerning pregnancy termination
that emerged in the 1960s. Courts were called to strike a balance in contexts
5 Reva B. Siegel, “TheConstitutionalization of Abortion,” inMichel Rosenfeld and Andra´s Sajo´,
eds., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), 1057–78.
6 Machteld Nijsten, Abortion and Constitutional Law: A Comparative European-American
Study (Firenze: European University Institute, 1990).
7 Constitutional Court, Italy, Final Judgment no. 27/1975. 8 Ibid.
9 See Susanna Mancini and Michel Rosenfeld, “The Judge as Moral Arbiter? The Case of
Abortion,” in Andra´s Sajo´ and Rena´ta Uitz, eds., Constitutional Topography: Values and
Constitutions (Meppel, NL: Boom Eleven International, 2010), 299–316.
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characterized by a profound split over ultimate moral values and political
conceptions. Contestation of traditional mores and the patriarchal family by
the feminist and the youth movements was met with resistance from tradi
tional social actors and with new forms of conservative and religious activism.
Feminists upheld “[t]he right of [a] woman to control her reproductive
process . . . as a basic, inalienable civil right, not to be denied or abridged by
the state.”10 Pro life movements opposed the legalization of abortion on the
ground that “personhood” should be attributed to the fetus. The judges were
confronted with a particularly high level of indeterminacy in that no legal
system provided a clear answer concerning the existence, the content, and the
limitations of the right to have an abortion, nor did it furnish a clear definition
of what has to be regarded as a “person.” As a consequence of such indetermi
nacy, courts had to engage not only with a bitter political split, but also with
the moral content of legal provisions, exposing themselves to charges of
unfairness or of having imposed contestable moral prescriptions illegitimately.
The five 1970s judicial decisions were contingent on the relevant constitu
tional provisions, the political climate, and the particular conflicting concep
tions of the good in play within the relevant polity. The US Supreme Court
conceptualized a constitutional right to abortion, whereas all of the European
courts constructed abortion as the exception to the no abortion rule.
Paradoxically, however, these prima facie incommensurable decisions pro
duced very similar practical outcomes: all courts both required the grant of
some access to abortion to a pregnant woman and afforded some degree of
protection to the fetus, precluding an unlimited right to abortion.11 As Udo
Werner puts it, while the US Supreme Court “recognized a woman’s privilege
to remain free from the state’s interference in abortion decisions,” the
European courts “granted immunity from the legal power of the state in its
application of the penalty law to satisfy its obligation to protect unborn life.”12
This difference, while important technically and symbolically, did not notably
affect women’s actual access to abortion, or the fact that, if abortion was legal,
“women make the final choice about their pregnancy.”13
10 Betty Friedan, “Speech at the First National Conference for the Repeal of Abortion Laws,
Chicago, January 1969,” in Betty Friedan, ed., It Changed My Life (New York: Random
House, 1976), 171.
11 Richard E. Levy and Alexander Somek, “Paradoxical Parallels in the American and German
Abortion Decisions,” Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 9 (2001): 109–66.
12 Udo Werner, “The Convergence of Abortion Regulation in Germany and the United States:
A Critique to Glendon’s Rights Talk Thesis,” Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review 18 (1996): 571–603, at 599.
13 Ibid., 599.
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In Europe, the 1970s abortion decisions (and the subsequent laws that
granted access to abortion) displeased several political and social actors, but
did not turn the abortion into a perennial political struggle, nor did they
damage the institutional authority and legitimacy of the judiciary. Thus,
unlike in the United States, in Europe abortion controversy has remained at
the margin of political life. For a long time, Western European pro life
movements kept a low profile, avoiding direct attacks on abortion laws and
concentrating their action on mainly local initiatives aimed at spreading the
“culture of life” and on charitable programs for women facing unwanted
pregnancies.14 Pro life activism regained momentum in the 1990s and 2000s
as a direct consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall, of the dramatic demo
graphic changes that had occurred especially in Eastern Europe, and of the
turn toward neoliberal economies.15 In Western Europe the cultural and
political climate had deeply changed since the 1970s: the feminist movement
was hardly visible, Catholic ideology was regaining importance “as a factor of
political consensus,” and scientific and medical developments, such as image
diagnostics, assisted reproduction techniques, abortion drugs, and so forth,
had taken place, allowing for new antiabortion discourses.16 In Central and
Eastern Europe, “abortion rights had been restricted . . . due to the political
revitalization of religious institutions . . . and the general ‘remasculinization’
of the region, manifested in a backlash against the gender equality ideology
presumably imposed by communism.”17 These factors set the premises for the
intensification of antiabortion activism and for a shift in its strategy and
agenda. Pro lifers have become more visible and vocal and have regained
interest in the legal and political dimensions of abortion. The European
institutions as well as the very existence of a European public sphere provide
new opportunities for pro life movements. Thus, antiabortion groups work at
the national as well as at the European level, challenging legal measures,
submitting briefs, monitoring the work of national and European institutions,
and attempting to influence political actors and decision making processes.
The reawakening of European antiabortion movements has been met with
much enthusiasm by their American counterparts: it has inaugurated a phase
of intense transatlantic dialogue among pro life supporters.
14 Claudia Mattalucci, “Contesting Abortion Rights in Contemporary Italy: Discourses and
Practices of Pro-Life Activism,” in Silvia de Zordo, Joanna Mishtal, and Lorena Anton, eds.,
A Fragmented Landscape: Abortion Governance and Protest Logics in Europe (New York:
Berghahn Books, 2017), 85–101, at 87.
15 Silvia de Zordo, Joanna Mishtal, and Lorena Anton, “Introduction,” in ibid., 6.
16 Mattalucci, “Contesting Abortion Rights,” 87–88.
17 De Zordo, Mishtal, and Anton, “Introduction,” 6.
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Unlike in Europe, abortion took center stage in American politics since the
1973 US Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade.18 This decision raised
awareness of the counter majoritarian difficulty, exacerbated issues of feder
alism, and deepened social and political polarization, leading, according to
many commentators, to the birth of the New Right.19 The rise of fundamen
talist Protestantism as a political force played a key role in the radicalization of
US pro life activism in the years following Roe. The commingling of radical
Christian narratives and the post Vietnam War paramilitary culture charged
the abortion discourse to an epic dimension, depicting it as a sort of American
Armageddon.20 In the decades following Roe, the pro life movement interior
ized the narrative according to which abortion is an ultimate war between
Christ and the Antichrist. Antiabortion terrorism hit the United States, culmi
nating in the murder of “abortion doctor” David Gunn in 1993, which
signaled, as Carol Mason explains, “a move away from protest and toward
retribution . . . to restore the order of God.”21
Pro life extremism and violence did not prove a successful strategy.
It alienated mainstream Americans, and especially women, who felt that
their rights and needs had been disregarded in the light of the absolute
protection of the fetus, and had difficulties engaging with an openly misogy
nist movement and narrative. In the hope to recuperate popularity among the
“middle majority” and to becomemore attractive to potential women activists,
the antiabortion movement began to rethink its strategy, shifting the focus
from the fetus to the woman. David Reardon, in his 1996 book Making
Abortion Rare, a sort of manifesto of the new antiabortion argumentative
line, articulated the need to “change the abortion debate so that we are
arguing with our opponents on their own turf, on the issue of defending the
interests of women.”22 Reardon argued that the conflicting rights model had to
give way to a narrative of reconciliation, on the ground that “[t]he middle
majority is paralyzed by competing feelings of compassion for both the unborn
and for women.”23 Hence, “[a]ccepting the fact that the middle majority’s
concerns are primarily focused on the woman is a prerequisite to developing
18 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19 Robert Post and Reva B. Siegel, “Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,”
Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review 42, no. 2 (2007): 373–434.
20 Carol Mason, Killing for Life: The Apocalyptic Narrative of Pro-Life Politics (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2002), 4.
21 Ibid., 4.
22 David Reardon, Making Abortion Rare: A Healing Strategy for a Divided Nation (Randburg,
ZA: Acorn, 1996), Introduction, www.afterabortion.org/MAR/marsum.html.
23 David Reardon, “Chapter II,” Making Abortion Rare, http://afterabortion.org/MAR/IGCHA
P2.htm.
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a successful pro woman/pro life strategy. Rather than trying to reduce public
sympathy for women, we want to increase it and align it with our own outrage
at how women are being victimized.”24
To feminize the antiabortion discourse, the pro life movement reduced the
space of morality in opposing abortion. As Reardon puts it,
Rather than getting bogged down in arguments with moral agnostics, we can
simply capitalize on their refusal to judge. To do so we need simply to ask the
relativists: Who are we to say that post aborted women have not suffered?
Who are we to say they should not be allowed compensation for their pain?
If we are to be fair and compassionate, shouldn’t they be allowed their day in
court?25
Instead of focusing primarily on the representation of the fetus as a person, the
antiabortion discourse shifted its attention to women’s rights and women’s
health. It appropriated feminist language and human rights rhetoric as well as
scientific and medical jargon. Instead of showing graphic images of aborted
fetuses and blaming women for killing their unborn babies, it began to suggest
that women were hurt by abortion. Central to the growing success of the new
antiabortion strategy were the alleged link between abortion and breast cancer
and the invention of the post abortion syndrome (PAS). Thus, the previous
focus on morality and emotions gave way to a “rational” (scientific) message:
abortion jeopardizes women’s physical and mental health. This message
achieved two important results: it turned women frommurderers into victims,
eliminating altogether the notion that a conflict of rights exists, and it provided
a new legal platform to challenge abortion regulation. As Ellie Lee explains,
“Central to the PAS claim is a critique of the legal concepts and arguments
that have tended to legitimize abortion”: courts and legislators have wrongly
assumed that abortion is a safe procedure, but under the new frame, govern
ment should restrict or prohibit abortion to protect women’s health.26 This
24 Reardon, Making Abortion Rare, 32–33. “The abortion debate has typically been framed as
a conflict between women’s rights and the rights of the unborn. Pro-abortionists have con-
sciously defined the issue in these terms to polarize public opinion and paralyze the middle
majority – the ‘fence sitting’ 50 percent or more who feel torn between the woman and the
child – so they will remain neutral. Unfortunately, many pro-lifers are all too willing to accept
this characterization of the issue. In practice, they even reinforce it by rushing to announce the
conclusion, which the middle majority refuses to embrace, that the right of the unborn child
to live must always prevail over the needs and desires of the woman. This conclusion, however
morally sound, does not help the middle majority in its search to escape the paralysis of
compassion for both the unborn and their mothers.” Reardon, Making Abortion Rare, 25–26.
25 Reardon, “Chapter II,” Making Abortion Rare, http://afterabortion.org/MAR/IGCHAP2.htm.
26 Ellie Lee, Abortion, Motherhood, and Mental Health: Medicalizing Reproduction in the
United States and Great Britain (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2003), 38.
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paved the way for the implementation of new political and legal antiabortion
strategies, including the spreading of therapeutic services offered to post
abortion women, as well as attempts to change the law concerning informed
consent, on the ground that women need to be aware of the health risks
associated with abortion, and the “mounting of malpractice suits against
abortion clinics and physicians with the intent of making them
uninsurable.”27 In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health28
the US Supreme Court struck down, together with other abortion restrictions,
an “informed consent” provision, according to which women willing to
terminate their pregnancy had to be informed “[t]hat abortion is a major
surgical procedure which can result in serious complications, including
hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility
andmiscarriage and prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion
may leave essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing psychological
problems she may have, and can result in severe emotional disturbances.”29
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,30 however, the Court
opened the door to women protective antiabortion arguments, holding that
“[i]n attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of
her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that
a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating
psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.”31
Since the mid 1990s, informed consent legislation in the United States has
become a battlefield. Several states, for example, have introduced legislation
concerning the use of medically unnecessary ultrasound in connection with
abortion services. In North Carolina and Kentucky, laws that compelled
doctors to display and narrate in detail an ultrasound to a woman prior to
providing an abortion, even if the woman objects and the doctor believes that
this is harmful to the patient, were struck down by the courts32 on the ground
27 Patricia Jasen, “Breast Cancer and the Politics of Abortion in the United States,” Medical
History 49, no. 4 (October 1, 2005): 423–44, notes that “[e]arly in 1995, the British Medical
Journal noted the growing importance of malpractice suits in the US aimed at forcing
abortionists out of business. The author described how an organization called Life
Dynamics assembled evidence of the alleged harm caused to individual women following
abortion, including the danger of breast cancer, while helping to link lawyers with potential
clients. Their long-term goal was to establish the legal understanding that women could sue,
even years later, for any adverse effects of abortion.”
28 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 29 Ibid., 445.
30 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992).
31 Ibid., 882.
32 US Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit,Gretchen S. Stuart v. Paul S. CamnitzNo. 14-1150
(2014) (Wilkinson) and US District Court Western District of Kentucky Louisville Division,
EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C., et al. v. Andrew G. Beshear, et al. (2017) (Hale).
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that: “[t]his compelled speech, even though it is a regulation of the medical
profession, is ideological in intent and in kind.”33
No scientific study could conclusively establish that abortion augments
the risk of developing breast cancer,34 nor that women develop a specific
posttraumatic disorder after terminating a pregnancy.35 The narratives
according to which these cause and effect relations actually exist and have
been irrefutably proven has, however, permeated the abortion discourses
well beyond the United States. Women protective arguments, being focused
on individual health rather than on religious and moral principles, proved
particularly appealing in Western European secularized and strongly indi
vidualistic societies.36 In the United Kingdom, where Vincent Rues, the
American inventor of PAS, spoke at a 1989 meeting of pro life politicians,37
the argument according to which abortion objectively damages women’s
health has become dominant in the leaflets and books disseminated by pro
life activists.38 These arguments made their appearance in British decision
making bodies in the late 1980s. In 1987, for example, during a debate
concerning a bill aimed at restricting the legal time for abortion,
a Member of Parliament expressed his concern over the “psychiatric mor
bidity experience[d] by a woman after an abortion.”39 PAS began to appear
across Europe and Latin America, to be discussed in the press and to be used
in a variety of debates concerning abortion legislation, for example in
opposing early and chemical abortions, on the ground that their “easiness”
conceals to women abortion’s side effects.
Aciprensa, the world’s largest Spanish language Catholic website, with
sister websites in Italian and Portuguese, disseminates countless articles
33 US Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit,Gretchen S. Stuart v. Paul S. CamnitzNo. 14-1150
(2014) (Wilkinson).
34 For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Jasen, “Breast Cancer.” See also American
Cancer Society, “Abortion and Breast Cancer Risk,” www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/
medical-treatments/abortion-and-breast-cancer-risk.html (accessed May 20, 2017).
35 The existence of PAS has not been acknowledged by any accredited medical or scientific
association. The Council of Representatives of the American Psychological Association
charged the Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion (TFMHA) with “collecting, examin-
ing, and summarizing the scientific research addressing the mental health factors associated
with abortion, including the psychological responses following abortion, and producing
a report based upon a review of the most current research.” None of the literature reviewed
adequately addressed the prevalence of mental health problems among women in the United
States who have had an abortion: Report of the APA Task Force on Mental Health and
Abortion, www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf (accessed May 22,
2017).
36 Lee, Abortion, Motherhood, and Mental Health. 37 Ibid., 25. 38 Ibid., 25.
39 Ibid., 21.
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maintaining that abortion hurts women and advocating for “[a] new strategy to
strengthen the pro life movement, focusing on the damages that abortion
causes to women, who are the second victim of the anti life laws and
mentality.”40 Social media looms as the most powerful means of disseminat
ing misleading information concerning the health risks associated with abor
tion. In 2017, the French Parliament adopted a law criminalizing the online
“spreading or transmitting allegations or indications liable to intentionally
mislead, on the characteristics or medical consequences of a voluntary inter
ruption of abortion with the purpose of deterring” women from abortion.41
According to the French health minister, Marisol Touraine, the bill was made
necessary by recent attacks against the right to abortion and by a “cultural
backdrop that tends to make women feel guilty when they consider terminat
ing a pregnancy.”42
8.3 FROM WOMEN PROTECTIVE TO SOCIETY PROTECTIVE
ARGUMENTS
The French health minister’s observation signals an important evolution of
the women protective antiabortion arguments, namely the shifting focus from
women’s health rights to women’s reproductive role. The narrative of PAS
contained the seeds for this shift since its existence was put forward by Vincent
Rue, a family therapist and a close ally of David Reardon, who made his name
when he testified before the US Congress in 1981, claiming that women who
undergo an abortion suffer from a variant of posttraumatic stress: “post
abortion syndrome.”43 Rue associated it with “psychic numbing”: post
abortion women may not exhibit any sign of posttraumatic stress for a long
time, and may spend years in a state of denial and actually never acknowledge
that they suffer from PAS. Said differently, women’s perception of their
experiences is irrelevant, and the absence of medical evidence suggesting
the existence of posttraumatic symptoms does not invalidate the claim that
40 “¿Co´mo afectael Aborto a las mujeres?,” ACI Prensa, www.aciprensa.com/recursos/como-
afecta-el-aborto-a-las-mujeres-84/ (accessed April 20, 2017) (authors’ translation).
41 LOI no. 2017–347 du 20 mars 2017 relative a` l’extension du de´lit d’entrave a` l’interruption
volontaire de grossesse, JORF no. 0068 du 21 mars 2017. This law was upheld by the
Constitutional Council in Decision no. 2017–747 DC, March 16, 2017.
42 Natalie Huet, “France to Sanction ‘Misleading’ Anti-AbortionWebsites,” Politico, February 2,
2017, www.politico.eu/article/france-to-sanction-misleading-anti-abortion-websites/
(accessed May 22, 2017).
43 Constitutional Amendments Relating to Abortion: Hearings on S.J. Res. 18, S.J. Res. 19, and
S.J. Res. 110 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong. 329–39 (1981) (testimony of Vincent Rue).
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abortion objectively hurts women and that its consequences will ultimately hit
their lives. These consequences, other than depression, include anger, diffi
culties in maintaining relationships, poor parenting skills, low self esteem,
eating disorders, substance abuse, sexual problems, inability to communicate,
and suicidal tendencies.44 Moreover, as is the case with other posttraumatic
stress disorders, the damage done to the woman by abortion, if not addressed, is
likely to “pass to the next generation,” resulting in the post abortion woman
damaging her subsequent children.45
Assuming that abortion unlike other much more invasive medical
procedures is an objective affront to women’s mental health that gen
erates lifelong consequences that especially hurt women’s emotional
sphere, their intimacy, and parenting skills infers that abortion runs coun
ter to women’s nature and, thus, compromises women’s domestic and
social role. As Reva Siegel puts it, “a woman who has an abortion has
been injured in her very womanhood she is impaired in her capacity to
perform as a wife and mother.”46 What follows is that government should
protect women, by outlawing abortion, to protect them from themselves, so
that their traditional role is safeguarded. Such gender paternalistic justifi
cations for restricting access to abortion turn the very notion of reproduc
tive rights on its head: the law needs to protect women’s “natural” role as
wives and mothers by taking away from them the very possibility of making
reproductive choices. This narrative has become a fundamental tenet of
contemporary antiabortion discourses across continents. Reva Siegel has
powerfully tracked its spread across the United States,47 showing how from
social movements, gender paternalistic antiabortion arguments have made
their way into the Supreme Court. In 2007, in the case of Gonzales
v. Carhart,48 which upheld a federal ban to a particular abortion procedure
that the majority deemed “gruesome,” the Court held that “[t]he State has
an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed,” because
“[w]hile we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to
abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and
loss of esteem can follow.”49
44 Anne C. Speckhard and Vincent M. Rue, “Post-Abortion Syndrome: An Emerging Public
Health Concern,” Journal of Social Issues 48, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 95–119.
45 Nick Hopkins, Steve Reicher, and Jannat Saleem, “Constructing Women’s Psychological
Health in Anti-Abortion Rhetoric,” Sociological Review 44, no. 3 (August 1996): 539–64, at 557.
46 Reva B. Siegel, “The Rights’ Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-
Protective Anti-Abortion Argument,” Duke Law Journal 57 (2008): 1641–92, at 1655.
47 Ibid., 1655. 48 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 49 Ibid., 128.
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Gender paternalistic antiabortion arguments have reached well beyond
the United States. In 2005, for example, Hungarian extreme right wing
politician Krisztina Morvai, then a member of the UN Committee for the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and presently a member of
the European Parliament, maintained that “[n]o woman actually wants to
have an abortion. We have this illusion that women have free choices. But
abortion is a terribly damaging thing psychologically, spiritually and physi
cally.” Morvai expressed her hope that one day “abortion will be the past”
and that it will be looked upon as “like torture in the field of human rights.”
She also pointed out that many women resort to abortion because of pressure
put upon them by their male partners and called for a greater focus on the
“responsibility of men.”50 In 2013, the Spanish minister of justice, Alberto
Ruis Gallardon, attempted to repeal the progressive abortion law adopted
during the Zapatero government with a heavily restrictive one, entitled
“Protection of Life and of the Rights of Pregnant Women.” Gallardon
justified the need to restrict abortion rights “to protect the weakest subjects,
the unborn children, but always in the interest of women,” who are “the
victims of abortion” and of the “structural gender violence” that is conducive
to abortion. “Abortion is a personal tragedy,” he added, before explaining
that the law should liberate women from it in order to fulfill their natural
role: “Motherhood is what makes women real women.”51
Morvai’s and Gallardon’s reference to coercion and violence are typical of
gender based paternalistic arguments. The assumption is that if women were
informed and not coerced into having abortion, they would never engage in an
unnatural act fraught with traumatic consequences. The narrative according
to which women are pressured or compelled to abort is widespread in pro life
propaganda. The US based website Unchoice.com, for example, states: “Over
half of abortions in America are unwanted or coerced, and many here and
elsewhere are forced, followed by serious aftereffects, ranging from physical
injury and post traumatic stress to death of the mother, too.”52 The website
heavily relies on narratives that echo feminist battles, such as that against
domestic violence.
50 “‘Abortion Bad for Women,’ Protests United Nations Women’s Representative,”
LifeSiteNews, www.lifesitenews.com/news/abortion-bad-for-women-protests-united-
nations-womens-representative (accessed April 20, 2017).
51 Luis A. Sanz, “Gallardon: ‘La libertad de maternidades lo que a las mujeres les hace
aute´nticamente mujeres,’” El Mundo, March 27, 2012, www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/03/
27/espana/1332867371.html (accessed May 22, 2017).
52 “Abortion Is the Unchoice: Unwanted, Unsafe, Unfair,” Unchoice, http://theunchoice.org/in
tro.htm (accessed April 20, 2017).
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Many pregnant women have been killed by partners trying to prevent the
birth. Simply being pregnant places women at higher risk of being
attacked. Homicide is the leading cause of death among pregnant
women. Women are aware of these risks. 92% of women surveyed list
domestic violence and assault as the women’s issue that is of highest
concern to them.53
The correlation between coercion and abortion has also made its appearance
in legal documents. In 2010, for example, the Canadian Parliament tabled Bill
C 5, entitled “An Act to Prevent Coercion of Pregnant Women to Abort.”
The bill, which was ultimately defeated, protected pregnant women against
coerced abortions on the grounds that “many pregnant women have been
coerced to have an abortion and have suffered grievous physical, emotional
and psychological harm as a result.”54
Reproductive rights are a crucial component of women’s equality. As the
US Supreme Court recognized in Casey, women’s ability to realize their full
potential is intimately connected to “their ability to control their reproductive
lives.”55 Thus, restrictions on abortion access affect women’s autonomy to
determine the course of their lives, and to enjoy equal citizenship stature.56
Restrictions motivated by arguments centered on women’s nature are particu
larly pernicious in this respect, because their effect is not limited to inter
ference with women’s equal rights. These restrictions question women’s
agency and women’s wholeness as rights holders, because they are founded
on the claim that the law should recognize that men and women have
different roles based on their biology. This claim is reminiscent of nineteenth
century biological and medical arguments supporting opinions about the
existence of a “natural” difference between men and women. These natural
differences centered on women’s reproductive role and supported their intel
lectual inferiority and legal status. As Cesare Lombroso, the Italian founder of
Positivist Criminology, explained in 1893, “intelligence varies inversely to
fecundity . . . [T]here is an antagonism between the reproductive and intel
lectual functions. Today the work of reproduction has for the most part
devolved onto the woman and for this biological reason she has been left
53 “Forced Abortion in America,” Unchoice, 2, www.theunchoice.com/pdf/FactSheets/Forced
Abortions.pdf (accessed April 20, 2017).
54 www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language E&Mode 1&
DocId 4427296&File 24#1.
55 505 U.S., at 856.
56 Reva B. Siegel, “Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection,” Stanford Law Review 44 (1992): 261–365.
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behind in intellectual development . . . Women of high intelligence . . . are
often sterile.”57
The fight against reproductive rights in the name of preserving gender roles
has unsurprisingly shifted from abortion to contraception. This shift indicated
without ambiguities that the value of pre birth life is not the fundamental
interest at stake in the struggle against reproductive rights. Like women
protective antiabortion arguments, anti contraception ones are presented
prima facie as scientific evidence of health risks associated with the use of
certain drugs and devices. The discourse, however, reaches well beyond
women’s health and translates into a general critique of liberal gender equal
ity. An article published in 2015 by the Linacre Quarterly, the official journal of
the Catholic Medical Association, explores the “[p]sychological, social, and
spiritual effects of contraceptive” drugs, and concludes that “[c]oincidental to
the use of ‘the pill’ there has been an increase in depression, low sexual desire,
‘hook ups,’ cohabitation, delay of marriage and childbearing.”58 In the United
States, conservative Christian actors and legal scholars have made claims
against public policies in favor of contraception, challenging the notion,
supported by the Obama administration as well as by “other influential groups
and organizations for example the United Nations and leading medical
organizations” that “access to contraception, and in some cases abortion, is
an essential and basic aspect of women’s health care and even overall
flourishing.”59 Helen Alvare, a law professor at George Mason University,
claims that contraception does not prevent unintended pregnancies, because,
inter alia, “a woman’s opinion might shift over the course of the pregnancy”60
and because “increased access to contraception is associated with the normal
ization of nonmarital sex and an increase in teen sexual behaviors leading to
more teen pregnancies and abortions overall.”61 Moreover, “increasing access
to contraception associated with a message of sexual expression as freedom,
and the good of sexual expression outside of the context of a relational
commitment, or parenting might itself harm women’s health.”62
These developments show that antiabortion discourses are increasingly
characterized as protective of collective societal values, such as the
57 Cesare Lombroso and Guglielmo Ferrero, Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal
Woman, ed. Nicole Hahn Rafter and Mary Gibson (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2004), 87.
58 Hanna Clause and Manuel Cortes, “Psychological, Social, and Spiritual Effects of
Contraceptive Steroid Hormones,” Linacre Quarterly 82, no. 3 (August 2015): 283–300.
59 Helen M. Alvare, “No Compelling Interest: The ‘Birth Control’ Mandate and Religious
Freedom,” Villanova Law Review 58, no. 3 (2013): 379–436, at 389.
60 Ibid., 396. 61 Ibid., 401. 62 Ibid., 414.
234 Susanna Mancini and Kristina Stoeckl
preservation of patriarchal structures and gender hierarchies, as well as sensi
tive to demographic preoccupations. An explicit assertion of the societal
damages of abortion is contained in the “Report of the South Dakota Task
Force to Study Abortion,” which the legislature of South Dakota created in
2005 with the aim to prepare a report that included proposals to change
legislation. The report heavily relies on women protective justifications for
banning abortion. It also, however, elaborates at length on the societal harm it
produces:
The impact this pain, sadness, and anger has on our society is difficult to
measure. We know it results in parenting problems, substance abuse, pro
blems with relationships and personal issues, and sexual dysfunction. We do
not know the cost of abortion to our society, in the form of the lack of
productivity of the women, but we fear it is far greater than we can imagine.
We do not know the cost to our society of losing the children who die in
abortions, but we fear that the loss of their talent, productivity, and their love
for their families and companionship with their mothers is far too great for us
to imagine.
We do not know the cost to our society by the shattered and broken relation
ships caused by abortion, and the anger and pain resulting from abortion, but
we fear it is far worse than what we are able to comprehend.What we do know,
and what we can say, is that abortion is unethical and immoral and our support
of it as a society wounds all of us. It exploits the mother, destroys her rights,
destroys her interests, and damages her health, and does so by killing her child.
It isolates her in her pain by placing all of the blame for the loss of her child
upon her. It kills an innocent human being, and in the process creates the
illusion that a mother and her child who in reality have interests in harmony
with each other are somehow enemies. It portrays life, the greatest of gifts, as
an intruder of no worth. It portrays the role of mother as valueless.63
The Task Force emphasizes also the economic damages resulting from the
legalization of abortion:
By 1996, the cumulative effect of legalized abortion in the state was the loss of
over 13,000 annually in the South Dakota K 12 school systems, and this
number has remained at over 13,000 fewer students annually for the period
1996 2003. Declining enrollment is a major problem for our K 12 school
system. We cannot begin to estimate the earnings and other contributions
that these citizens would have made to our State.64
63 “Report of the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, 2005,”Dakota Voice, 33–34, www
.dakotavoice.com/Docs/South%20Dakota%20Abortion%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf
(accessed May 31, 2017).
64 Ibid., 34.
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By relying on society protective arguments, conservative social movements
pursue a political agenda that reaches well beyond the regulation of repro
ductive rights, and is centered on the defense of the “natural family” as the
fundamental unit of society. This agenda is clearly articulated in the
“Manifesto of the Natural Family” written by Allan Carlson in 2005.
The manifesto upholds the notion of gender equality not as equal treatment,
but as complementarity:
We affirm that women and men are equal in dignity and innate human rights,
but different in function. Even if sometimes thwarted by events beyond the
individual’s control (or sometimes given up for a religious vocation), the calling
of each boy is to becomehusband and father; the calling of each girl is to become
wife and mother. Everything that a man does is mediated by his aptness for
fatherhood. Everything a woman does is mediated by her aptness for mother
hood. Culture, law, and policy should take these differences into account.65
We believe wholeheartedly in women’s rights. Above all, we believe in
rights that recognize women’s unique gifts of pregnancy, birthing, and
breastfeeding. The goal of androgyny, the effort to eliminate real difference
between women and men, does every bit as much violence to human nature
and human rights as the old efforts by the communists to create “SovietMan”
and by the Nazis to create “Aryan Man.”66
Interestingly, Carlson’s manifesto relied, inter alia, on the work of Pitirim
A. Sorokin, a Russian e´migre´ Harvard sociologist (1889 1968), who, together
with Carle Zimmerman, wrote several influential studies in rural sociology,
according to which only a rural lifestyle, based on a traditional model of
family, an economy of manual work and home business, and a strong link of
the individual to the inhabited territory, is sociologically, demographically,
and economically sustainable.67 Sorokin furthermore abhorred the changes in
American society, which he denounced in his pamphlet The American Sex
Revolution,68 and he argued that “marriage and the family must be restored to
their place of dignity among the greatest values in human life, not to be trifled
with. As a socially sanctioned union of husband and wife, of parents and
children, the family is to be radically differentiated from all unsanctioned sex
association.”69
65 Allan C. Carlson and Paul T. Mero, The Natural Family: A Manifesto (Dallas, TX: Spence
Publishing, 2007), 25.
66 Ibid., 25.
67 Pitirim A. Sorokin and Carle C. Zimmerman, Principles of Rural Urban Sociology
(New York: H. Holt, 1929).
68 Pitirim A. Sorokin, The American Sex Revolution (Boston, MA: P. Sargent, 1956).
69 Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Reconstruction of Humanity (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1948), 148.
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Sorokin’s theses are among the foundations for the secular, professional
pro family discourse advocated by Carlson and the organization he helped
to found, the World Congress of Families (WCF).70 These foundations
gained prominence when, in 1997, Carlson started to act as bridge builder
between American and Russian pro family activists. He traveled to Moscow
in order to meet a Russian scholar of similar views, demographer Anatoly
Antonov. Carlson and Antonov shared an understanding of the crisis of the
family and the roots of this crisis, and together, the men founded theWCF,71
which today functions as a transnational nongovernmental pro family
organization and has organized yearly congresses in support of the natural
family across Europe, the United States, and the former Soviet Union.
The important place of Russia in the global pro family and pro life move
ment is corroborated byWCFmanaging director Larry Jacobs, who said that
“[g]iven its traditional support for faith and family, Russia will play an
increasingly important part in the international struggle to preserve the
natural family.”72
The WCF created a space for a partnership between various stocks of right
wing conservative actors across the United States, Europe, and Russia,73
motivated by different domestic and regional preoccupations, but unified by
certain common transnational strategies, including that to “rebalance inter
national human rights back towards the local and the indigenous, weakening
the pull of a homogenizing, universal, and liberal agenda.”74 Women’s equal
ity, especially in the sphere of reproductive rights, constitutes a particularly
powerful obstacle in the pursuance of this agenda. Thus, just as had been the
case in Europe, Russian moral conservatives have developed a powerful anti
reproductive rights discourse, which, as we show in more detail, is heavily
influenced by the rhetoric of US pro life propaganda.
70 Dmitry Uzlaner and Kristina Stoeckl, “The Legacy of Pitirim Sorokin in the Transnational
Alliances of Moral Conservatives,” Journal of Classical Sociology, November 14, 2017, http://
journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1468795X17740734.
71 Christopher Stroop, “The Russian Origins of the So-Called Post-Secular Moment: Some
Preliminary Observations,” State, Religion and Church 1, no. 1 (2013): 59–82.
72 “Jacobs Finds Support for International Pro-Family and Pro-Life Movement in Moscow,”
Christian News Wire, December 13, 2010, www.christiannewswire.com/news/4302615709
.html (accessed May 24, 2017).
73 Doris Buss and Didi Herman, Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right in
International Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
74 Christopher McCrudden, “Human Rights, Southern Voices and ‘Traditional Values’ at the
United Nations,” University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 419 (May 28, 2014):
1–44, at 3, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid 2474271.
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8.4 ANTIABORTION DISCOURSE IN RUSSIA
8.4.1 The Russian Orthodox Church’s Antiabortion Discourse and the
Role of Conscientious Objection
Russia’s history of abortion can hardly be compared with that of Western
countries. The very nature of the legal and political system of the Soviet
Union prevented the emergence of any constitutional struggle over abortion,
together with the conceptualization of the latter as a “right.” Abortion was
treated as an issue of public health, and its space was determined chiefly by
demographic preoccupations: concerning population containment in the
1920s and concerning population growth under Stalin. Moreover, the absence
of religion in the Soviet public sphere and the collectivistic socialist philoso
phy prevented any public discourse concerning the morality of abortion. After
the fall of the USSR, however, abortion quickly became a central topic both
for the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and for lay religious actors.
The ROC tackled the abortion issue through a twofold lens. On one hand, it
associated abortion with the dramatic population decrease of the 1990s, raising
demographic concerns. On the other, it developed a theological discourse, in
which abortion emerged in the first place as a pastoral issue: in a country
where the average woman had undergone six or seven abortions in her life, and
many Russians were in the process of rediscovering their faith, the mass
abortions conducted during the Soviet past became a question for both
personal and collective atonement. Thus, for example, the narrative of PAS
was successfully transposed in Russia. Its significance, however, must be
understood in the specific post Soviet context, as a form of “collective
affliction.”75 As Sonja Luehrmann explains, PAS is filtered through the
Orthodox religion and collective trauma. The existence of the syndrome is
taken for granted and used as a scientific explanation by activists as to “why
women who had abortions need to participate in the struggle against it.”76
In post Soviet Russia, women who became involved in religious practice
traumatically “discovered” that they had committed a terrible sin: engaging
in antiabortion activism thus acquired the significance of saving the next
generation of women and giving a chance to a new generation of Russian
children: “Russian activists interpret [PAS] through the lens of teaching about
the consequences of sinful and virtuous actions that they learn through their
75 Sonja Luehrmann, “Innocence and Demographic Crisis: Transposing Post-Abortion
Syndrome into a Russian Orthodox Key,” in De Zordo, Mishtal, and Anton, Fragmented
Landscape, 103–22, at 116.
76 Ibid., 112.
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involvement with the Church.”77 Thus, unlike in theWest, PAS is not used by
antiabortion activists to lower the moralistic tone of pro life battles and to
emphasize the materialistic individual dimension of the damage produced by
abortion. To the contrary, “the trauma associated with abortion is imbued with
moral significance.” Unborn children, the victims of a collective sin, simulta
neously represent the horrors of the Soviet system and a hope for the future.
And, as Luehrmann further notices, they are easier to mourn than other
victims of the past regime, “because they pose no threat to the political
elites.”78
The ROC has never hidden its preference for a complete ban on abortions.
The teaching of the ROC on abortion has been elaborated in detail in the
document The Basis of the Social Teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church
(2000).79 The cardinal point of the ROC’s position is the rejection of abortion
as murder:
Since the ancient time the Church has viewed deliberate abortion as a grave
sin. The canons equate abortion withmurder. This assessment is based on the
conviction that the conception of a human being is a gift of God. Therefore,
from the moment of conception any encroachment on the life of a future
human being is criminal.80
As a consequence of this rejection, the ROC elaborates two strategic
attitudes vis a` vis abortion as a social fact and legal act. These attitudes appear
contradictory at first, because one includes strategies of retreat and conscien
tious objection of the lay Christian living in a society judged as apostatic,
whereas the other consists of active engagement of the Christian with public
and political life in order to “improve” society and change existing laws. From
the ROC’s perspective, the two attitudes are complementary and mutually
reinforcing through a division of tasks: the lay Christian believer is called to
bear witness to his or her faith through actions, and the Church hierarchies
commit to an active dialogue with state authorities in view of “guiding” public
morality, also in legislative terms.
The first strategic attitude is expressed in the Social Doctrine as follows:
“If the authority forces Orthodox believers to apostatize from Christ and His
Church and to commit sinful and spiritually harmful actions, the Church
should refuse to obey the state. The Christian, following the will of his
77 This and the following quote are from ibid., 113. 78 Ibid., 116.
79 “The Basis of the Social Concept,” Mospat, 2000, www.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-




conscience, can refuse to fulfill the commands of state forcing him into
a grave sin.”81
The second strategy is formulated by the ROC as a solution to the conflict
arising from the first:
If the Church and her holy authorities find it impossible to obey state laws
and orders, after a due consideration of the problem, they may take the
following action: enter into direct dialogue with authority on the problem,
call upon the people to use the democratic mechanisms to change the
legislation or review the authority’s decision, apply to international bodies
and the world public opinion and appeal to her faithful for peaceful civil
disobedience.82
Conscientious objection, therefore, is contemplated as a last resort rather than
preferred strategy.
The Social Doctrine further clarifies this issue. Conscientious objection is
evaluated by the Church in the first place as a harmful principle, because it
testifies that in the contemporary world, religion is turning from a “social”
into a “private” affair of a person. This process in itself indicates that the
spiritual value system has disintegrated and that most people in a society
which affirms the freedom of conscience no longer aspire for salvation . . .
The adoption of the freedom of conscience as legal principle points to the
fact that society has lost religious goals and values and become massively
apostate and actually indifferent to the task of the Church and to the over
coming of sin.83
Freedom of conscience is recognized only at a second step, as a last resort that
“has proved to be one of the means of the Church’s existence in the non
religious world, enabling her to enjoy a legal status in a secular state and
independence from those in society who believe differently or do not believe
at all.”84
Interestingly, an analogous view of conscientious objection was put forward
in 2009 by a coalition of conservative Christian leaders in the United States,
who signed theManhattan Declaration, a “call for Christian unity on issues of
life, marriage, and religious liberty.”85 The coalition of advocacy groups and
ministries cuts across Christian traditions: in addition to many US evangelical
and conservative Catholic leaders, its signatories include the primate of the
Anglican Church of Nigeria, and the primate of the Orthodox Church in
81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid.
85 “A Call of Christian Conscience,” Manhattan Declaration, 2009, http://manhattandeclara
tion.org/man dec resources/Manhattan Declaration full text.pdf (accessed May 30, 2017).
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America. Eric Teetsel, the executive president of the Manhattan
Declaration, was featured as a speaker at the 2015 World Congress of
Families in Salt Lake City. The declaration calls Christians “to affirm our
right and, more importantly, to embrace our obligation to speak and act in
defense” of Christian principles. “We pledge to each other, and to our fellow
believers, that no power on earth, be it cultural or political, will intimidate us
into silence or acquiescence.” Like the ROC, the drafters of the Manhattan
Declaration deplore the forced complicity of Christian taxpayers in provid
ing abortion services, stating that “[m]any in the present administration want
to make abortions legal at any stage of fetal development, and want to provide
abortions at taxpayer expense” and indicate the correct legislative regulation
of abortion, criticizing “[t]he President [who] has also pledged to make
abortion more easily and widely available by eliminating laws prohibiting
government funding, requiring waiting periods for women seeking abor
tions, and parental notification for abortions performed on minors.
The elimination of these important and effective pro life laws cannot reason
ably be expected to do other than significantly increase the number of
elective abortions.”86 In its final statement, the declaration openly vows
civil disobedience:
Because we honor justice and the common good, we will not comply with
any edict that purports to compel our institutions to participate in abortions,
embryo destructive research, assisted suicide and euthanasia, or any other
anti life act; nor will we bend to any rule purporting to force us to bless
immoral sexual partnerships, treat them as marriages or the equivalent, or
refrain from proclaiming the truth, as we know it, about morality and
immorality and marriage and the family. We will fully and ungrudgingly
render to Caesar what is Caesar’s. But under no circumstances will we render
to Caesar what is God’s.87
In the Social Doctrine of 2000, the ROC formulates a dual strategy for
dealing with the issue of abortion. On one hand (strategy 1), the Church insists
on the right of Christian doctors to refuse to conduct abortions on the ground
of conscience, and promotes the rights of the Christian taxpayer not to be
forced into compliance with public funding of abortions; and on the other
(strategy 2), the ROC offers itself as a partner of the state to implement
measures that will “align” public morality with the Church’s teachings.
Strategy 1 is repeated several times throughout the Social Doctrine and not
restricted to the question of abortion:
86 Ibid. 87 Ibid.
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When compliance with legal requirements threatens his eternal salvation
and involves an apostasy or commitment of another doubtless sin before God
and his neighbor, the Christian is called to perform the feat of confession for
the sake of God’s truth and the salvation of his soul for eternal life. He must
speak out lawfully against an indisputable violation committed by society or
state against the statutes and commandments of God. If this lawful action is
impossible or ineffective, hemust take up the position of civil disobedience.88
Chapter 11 of the Social Doctrine is dedicated to “Personal and national
health.” The very fact that “national health” is correlated with personal health
in the heading of the section suggests that the ROC sees individual health as
instrumental to the health of the people. This becomes especially clear in the
section dealing with abortion, which is introduced by an assessment of Russia’s
demographic crisis:
The Russian Orthodox Church has to state with deep concern that the
peoples she has traditionally nourished are in the state of demographical
crisis today . . . The Church has been continually occupied with demo
graphic problems. She is called to follow closely the legislative and admin
istrative processes in order to prevent decisions aggravating the situation. It is
necessary to conduct continuous dialogue with the government and the mass
media to interpret the Church’s stand on the demographic and healthcare
policy. The fight with depopulation should be included in the effective
support of medical research and social programs intended to protect mother
hood and childhood, the embryo and the newborn. The state is called to
support the birth and proper upbringing of children.89
Only after this explicit elaboration of strategy 2, is strategy 1, conscientious
objection, again brought into play: “Sin also lies with the doctor who per
formed the abortion. The Church calls upon the state to recognize the right of
medics to refuse to procure abortion for the reasons of conscience.” ROC
extends the “responsibility for the sin of the murder of the unborn child” also
“to the father if he gave his consent to the abortion” and concludes “[i]f a wife
had an abortion without the consent of her husband, it may be grounds for
divorce.” The ROC also condemns the use of “some contraceptives [that] have
an abortive effect, interrupting artificially the life of the embryo on the very
first stages of his life.”90 Other means of contraception, however, are not
ruled out.
Every single one of the points contemplated in the ROC Social Doctrine of
2000 with the view of changing the situation of abortion legislation in Russia
88 “Basis of the Social Concept,” Mospat. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid.
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has subsequently been developed in public and, specifically, political debates
about abortion, and in some cases has been incorporated in the legislative
frame.91 The Russian government proved sensitive to both the analysis and the
remedy proposed by the ROC. In the next section we showcase the contem
porary legal frame and political discourse in Russia, influenced by the ROC
position as well as by Western language and rhetoric.
Since 2000, Russia has:
1. Created a joint committee of the ROC and the Ministry of Health to
devise strategies reducing the numbers of abortion in 2010, which led to
2. Adopting a new law on public health that
a. adds consultation and a waiting period to the procedure of having an
abortion and
b. gives medical personnel the right to refuse abortions;
3. Seeing the emergence of pro life charity organizations;
4. Putting forward a legal proposal that makes the consent of male partners
obligatory for women to have an abortion;
5. Adopting legislation that forbids advertisement for abortion and “abor
tive contraceptives”; moreover,
6. In 2016, proposed a referendum to abolish abortion in Russia; and
7. In 2016, debated taking abortion off the social health care system.
8.4.2 The Changing Landscape of Abortion Legislation in Russia
In the Soviet Union, abortion was legalized in 1920 by the Bolsheviks, making
Russia the first modern state that offered women medical abortion services on
demand. Abortion was once again criminalized in 1936 and finally decrimi
nalized in 1954. Subsequently, abortion became one of the main means of
birth control as contraceptives were unavailable or unreliable and sexual
education was lacking.92 In 1987, when the abortion rate had already
91 Not only has the ROC’s position on abortion found political implementation, also the ROC’s
teaching on homosexuality has been written into law with the “Gay-Propaganda Legislation”
in 2012.
92 Cf. Alexandre Avdeev, Alain Blum, and Irina Troitskaya, “The History of Abortion Statistics in
Russia and the USSR from 1900 to 1991,” Population: An English Selection 7 (1995): 39–66, at
61–62, www.jstor.org/stable/2949057; A. A. Popov, “Family Planning in the USSR: Sky-High
Abortion Rates Reflect Dire Lack of Choice,” Entre Nous Cph Den 16 (September 1990): 5–7,
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/labs/articles/12222340; A. A. Popov, A. P. Visser, and E. Ketting,
“Contraceptive Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices in Russia during the 1980s,” Studies in
Family Planning 24, no. 4 (1993): 227–35, www.ncbi.nim.nih.gov/labs/articles/8212092/;
Victoria I. Sakevich and Boris P. Denisov, “Birth Control in Russia: Overcoming the State
System Resistance,”National Research University Higher School of Economics Working Paper
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decreased compared to the past decades, the average Soviet woman had five
abortions over her reproductive life span.93 Today, even though more than
twenty years have passed since the demise of the USSR, the rate of abortions in
Russia, albeit much lower than in the Soviet period, remains among the
highest in Europe.94 Against this background, since the beginning of the
2000s, Russia has seen a number of measures and initiatives aimed at reducing
abortions and increasing fertility and population growth. These measures on
one side, legal restrictions on abortions; on the other, nonlegal initiatives
aimed at preventing abortions have turned Russia from being the country
with one of the most liberal policies on access to abortion to a situation
comparable tomany European countries, where relatively restrictivemeasures
are in place.
The path to the present abortion regulations in Russia, in place since 2012,
was accompanied by fierce debates that unfolded at all three levels of argu
mentation previously identified, at one and the same time: the fetus’s right to
life, women’s health, and protection of society. Compared to Western coun
tries, pro life movements and activism in Russia are a recent phenomenon.
Thus, while in the West there has been a temporal shift from fetus protective
to women protective and to society protective arguments in opposing abor
tion, in Russia the three arguments came to prominence simultaneously and
merged in the public debate as a general narrative. What is special about the
Russian situation is that antiabortion debates continue to be highly politi
cized, with a new wave of society and fetus protective arguments paving the
way for potentially more restrictive legislation in the future.
In the early 1990s, during the wave of democratic reforms taking place in
Russia, the government adopted a federal target program on “Family
Planning,” which was designed to change societal attitudes toward reproduc
tive rights and sexual education. These efforts proved effective and by 2012, the
number of abortions was 25 percent of the 1990s figure.95
Since then, however, the official position of the government has changed
under the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. Denisov and others
write that “the Orthodox Church agitates extensively against advances in
Series: Sociology 42 (June 2014): 1–25, June 2014, hse.ru/data/2014/06/02/1324958898/42SO
C2014.pdf.
93 Luehrmann, “Innocence,” 105.
94 Francesca Stella and Nadya Nartova, “Sexual Citizenship, Nationalism and Biopolitics in
Putin’s Russia,” in Francesca Stella, Yvette Taylor, Tracey Reynolds, and Antoine Rogers,
eds., Sexuality, Citizenship and Belonging: Transnational and Intersectional Perspectives
(New York: Routledge, 2016), 24–42.
95 Sakevich and Denisov, “Birth Control in Russia,” 16–18.
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reproductive health and rights . . . [I]t successfully penetrated the public
health decision making process.” One source even states that between
1998 and 2012, reproductive health centers decreased from more than 400
to 21.96
Under the influence of segments of society holding traditionalist and
fundamentalist views, the advances in federal policies on family planning in
the 1990s have been reversed:
Today, they [traditionalists] constitute an influential social force, which stirs
up negative associations with and agitates against family planning. The belief
in the myth that birth control is synonymous to low fertility and that broader
access to family planning services inevitably leads to fertility reduction has
become rather widespread. This myth has not only become part of folk
common sense, but also has successfully penetrated the level of decision
makers. The resumption of a program, similar to “Family planning,” is hardly
possible given the current pronatalist course proclaimed by the Government
of Russia.97
Legal initiatives geared toward restricting access to abortions in Russia
started around the year 2000. The Russian law “Fundamentals of the Health
Care of Russian Citizens” from 1993 had legislated that abortions can be
performed upon women’s request up to twelve weeks of gestation or up to
twenty two weeks in the presence of certain “social reasons.” The definition of
what constitutes eligible “social reasons” changed several times during the
1990s and 2000s. In 2003, the list of eligible causes for legal abortions after
week 12 (except for medical reasons) was reduced drastically on the grounds of
a women protective argument, with the legislator arguing that late abortions
carry high risks for women’s health.98 The list was finally reduced, in 2012, to
only one point, namely rape.99
In 2011, the World Congress of Families (WCF) had held its first
Demographic Summit in Moscow, bringing together leading US evangelicals,
Orthodox Church leaders and prominent Russian politicians. In promotional
96 Adam Federman, “How US Evangelicals Fueled the Rise of Russia’s ‘Pro-Family’ Right,”
The Nation, January 7, 2014, www.thenation.com/article/177823/how us evangelicals
fueled rise russiaspro family right (accessed April 6, 2017).
97 Boris P. Denisov, Victoria I. Sakevich, and Aiva Jasilioniene, “Divergent Trends in Abortion
and Birth Control Practices in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine,” PLoS ONE 7, no. 11 (2012): 1–14,
at 8, http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0049986.
98 Steven Lee Myers, “After Decades, Russia Narrows Grounds for Abortions,”New York Times,
August 24, 2003.
99 Denisov et al. have found that abortions for “social reasons” represented only less than
1 percent of reported abortions (Denisov, Sakevich, and Jasilioniene, “Divergent Trends,” 4).
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materials the WCF claimed that the summit “helped pass the first Russian laws
restricting abortion in modern history.”100 In effect, the draft bill submitted to
the Duma stipulated, among other things, that before signing a consent form for
abortion, a womanwas required to visualize the fetus bymeans of ultrasound, to
listen to the fetal heartbeat, to consult with a psychologist “that has to explain the
right to refuse abortion.”101 While this rhetoric and language previously had no
place in the Russian legal system, we have seen in our previous analysis that it is
widespread in the US pro life propaganda, and that analogous provisions have
been adopted in several US states’ law.
Erofeeva, and Denisov and others, associate the gradual tightening of repro
ductive rights in Russia over the past two decades with the official rhetoric of
traditional family values and demographic crisis. In 2006, President Vladimir
Putinmade Russia’s demographic decline amajor point of his annual address to
the nation. One year later, the Russian government launched a program entitled
“Demographic Policy for the Russian Federation Present to 2025.”
The program included monetary incentives for women to have more children
and was almost exclusively built around a one time monetary measure called
“maternal capital.”102 During the same years, several legislative proposals were
discussed, for example a complete ban on abortions, or the requirement to get
a husband’s approval for abortions, none of which made it beyond the proposal
stage.103 However, things began to change, according to Erofeeva, when in 2010
the Russian State Duma installed a Women, Family and Children Issue
Committee with the participation of the Russian Orthodox Church. This
committee, she concludes, had a decisive impact on the new Russian health
law, which changed access to abortion significantly in 2012.
The new law, “On the Fundamental Health Care Principles in the Russian
Federation” (N232 FZ), included measures such as establishing a mandatory
“week of silence” from seven days to forty eight hours between the visit to
a medical facility and the termination of pregnancy, depending on gestational
age (Article 36), and the right of the doctor to refuse to perform medical
“termination of pregnancy if it does not directly threaten the patient’s life and
health of others” (Article 70).104
100 Federman, “US Evangelicals.” 101 Stella and Nartova, “Sexual Citizenship,” 8.
102 Michele Rivkin-Fish, “Pronatalism, Gender Politics, and the Renewal of Family Support in
Russia: Toward a Feminist Anthropology of ‘Maternity Capital,’” Slavic Review 69, no. 3 (Fall
2010): 701–24.
103 Lyubov Vladimirovna Erofeeva, “Traditional Christian Values and Women’s Reproductive
Rights inModern Russia – Is a Consensus Ever Possible?,”American Journal of Public Health
103, no. 11 (2013): 1931–34, at 1931–32, http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301329.
104 Stella and Nartova, “Sexual Citizenship,” 8–9.
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The 2012 law on fundamental health care principles effectively rendered the
Russian abortion legislation similar to the situation in many Western
European countries. It soon became quite evident, however, that the battle
against abortions in Russia was not over with this step.105
8.5 PARALLELISMS IN TRANSNATIONAL SOCIETY PROTECTIVE
ANTIABORTION STRATEGIES
Despite the deep divergences in the history of abortion in Russia and theWest,
and despite the different significances of contemporary antiabortion struggles,
current strategies against abortion in Russia and the West show some surpris
ing similarities. In both cases antiabortion activism targets simultaneously the
legal frame that allows for abortion as well as the de facto access to abortion
services. Moreover, in all cases, antiabortion movements exhibit an incre
mental strategy: they pursue a particular legal change, but, once they obtain it,
conflict is not settled. To the contrary, each victory galvanizes pro life activists,
who raise the threshold and engage in new battles.
Several legal initiatives have followed the 2012 health law reform in Russia,
all of which have the intention to further restrict access to abortion. This new
set of initiatives thrives on society protective arguments, such as in 2014,
legislation on advertising (N38 FZ “On Advertisement,” Article 7) that ren
dered advertisement for abortions illegal, or, in 2015, an initiative to exclude
abortions from the public health service. This last initiative resulted from the
joint effort by members of Parliament Elena Mizulina and Vitaly
Milonovand, and the ROC, with Patriarch Kirill arguing that believers have
to be “liberated” from their obligatory compliance with the murdering of
children through the state imposed social security tax.106 This initiative failed
to get support from the government. Yet, starting in December 2017 all
medical facilities that offer abortions will have to obtain a special license.
Interestingly, while the US and Russian health systems can hardly be com
pared, a strategy aimed at drastically reducing the number of abortion provi
ders through clinic licensing has been at play in the United States for many
years. In 2017, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt107 the US Supreme
105 It is important to add that sociologists, based on comparative studies, have predicted that
Russia’s exclusive focus on reducing abortions as a means to increase fertility levels will fail to
achieve its goal if not combined with an equal investment in sexual education and family-
planning programs (Denisov, Sakevich, and Jasilioniene, “Divergent Trends”).
106 “B Moskve Sostoyalos’ Sobranie Pravoslavnoj Obshchestvennosti, Vystupayushchej Protiv
Abortov,” Mospat, June 29, 2015, www.mospat.ru/archive/41595.htm.
107 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. (2016).
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Court struck down a number of provisions in Texas that required abortion
providers to obtain admitting privileges and adhere to prohibitively expen
sive building requirements (like down to the inch dimensions for hallways
and janitors’ closets). These requirements would have shut down most
clinics in Texas and in other states, such as Alabama, Mississippi, and
Wisconsin, where efforts to enforce similar abortion restrictions fell. These
restrictions have been traditionally defended by conservative politicians and
pro life activists on the ground that they aim at protecting women’s health.108
In Russia, the new government decree on clinic licensing was interpreted in
the media as a bargain of the government with the pro life movement: the
government did not take abortions off the free social health care services, but
has tightened the control over abortion facilities.109 This licensing policy
creates the preconditions for taking abortions off the public health care
service in the future, since it will allow, for the first time, the obtaining of
precise statistics and information on abortions performed in Russia. It may
also lead to banning private clinics from offering abortions. Consequently,
the law could, in the long run, pave the way for even more restrictions on
abortions.110
The ROC furthermore appears to be contemplating additional measures in
terms of conscientious objection of medical personnel. When the 2012 law on
health was passed, church commentators were not satisfied with Article 70 and
would have preferred a more extensive article on conscientious objection to
abortion following the model of the Declaration of the World Medical
Association (WMA) of Oslo on Therapeutic Abortions.111 Given the
Church’s active participation in the antiabortion struggle, its doctrinal stance
on conscientious objection, and the influence of US pro life movements, it is
conceivable that the conflict over conscientious objection will escalate in
Russia similarly to how it has escalated in the West. Article 70, while rather
108 On the implications of this decision see LindaGreenhouse and Reva Siegel, “TheDifference
a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right after Whole Woman’s Health,”
Yale Law Journal Forum 126 (2016) (“Yale Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 578,”
SSRN, August 16, 2016, https://ssrn.com/abstract 2838562).
109 “Litsenziya Na Abort: Orenburgskie Kliniki Obyazali Poluchit’ Spetsial’noe Razreshenie,”
RIA 56, December 13, 2016, www.ria56.ru.
110 Dmitrij Ivanov, “Litsenziya Na Abort – Novyj Kamen’ Pretknoveniya Na Puti
Otechestvennogo Zdravookhraneniya,” February 15, 2017, Pravo-Med, www.pravo-med.ru.
111 Igumena Kseniya (Chernega), “Reply to the Question Chto mozhno posovetovat’ akusheru-
ginekologu, ne zhelayushchemu v svoej rabote proizvodit’ aborty? (What Advice Should
Be Given to the Obstetrician-Gynecologist Who Does Not Want to Perform Abortions in
His Work?),” Pastyr’/Priest.today, February 12, 2017. The WMA Declaration states that “If the
physician’s convictions do not allow him or her to advise or perform an abortion, he or she
may withdraw while ensuring the continuity of medical care by a qualified colleague.”
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restrictive compared to US and European provisions protecting medical
personnel unwilling to participate in abortion procedures, is remarkable in
the Russian legal frame, which did not traditionally recognize conscience
based exemptions to general laws. In Western democracies, the right to
conscientious objection arose in the context of individuals refusing to bear
arms or to serve in the army, and was invoked by marginal minorities (such as
Jehovah’s Witnesses or pacifists) holding anomalous religious or moral views.
With the decriminalization of abortion, most countries introduced provisions
providing the right to conscientious objection for medical personnel. Such
provisions were very similar to Article 70 of the Russian 2012 law. In Italy, for
example, Article 9 of Law 194/1978 states that medical personnel may object to
participating in abortion procedures, but that this does not apply to ancillary
activities (pre and post abortion care) and that objection may not be invoked
if a woman’s life is in danger. Moreover, this provision requires public health
care facilities to ensure that women have access to abortion procedures and
regional authorities to supervise and ensure the implementation of the law.
In Italy, just as in other Western countries, the rationale of conscientious
objection provisions was to shield medical personnel hired prior to the
decriminalization of abortion. In other words, in Western countries con
scientious objection was introduced as a necessary complement to the
liberalization of abortion: in the words of the UK Supreme Court, “[t]he
conscience clause was the quid pro quo for a law designed to enable the
health care profession to offer a lawful, safe and accessible service to
women.”112 In Russia, by contrast, Article 70 was adopted together with
other provisions aimed at restricting access to abortion, in a context where
medical personnel had traditionally treated pregnancy terminations as
a morally irrelevant form of contraception.
Since the 1970s, in Western countries, the claimed space for conscientious
objection in the field of reproductive rights has expanded dramatically.
Against the backdrop of a rather restrictive conscientious objection provision,
in today’s Italy more than 70 percent of medical personnel object to perform
ing abortions, young doctors are not trained to perform abortions, and those
who do not object often suffer career damages. The European Committee for
Social Rights condemned Italy in 2013113 for the “shortcomings [that] exist in
the provision of abortion services,” which violated the right to health care
112 Greater Glasgow Health Board (Appellant) v. Doogan and Another (Respondents) (Scotland)
[2014] [2015] AC 640, [2015] 2 All ER 1, [2015] 1 AC 640, [2014] UKSC 68.
113 International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF-EN) v. Italy,
Complaint no. 87/2012 (ECSR, decision adopted on September 10, 2013 and delivered
on March 10, 2014).
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alone and read in conjunction with the nondiscrimination clause. According
to the Committee, discriminatory treatment occurred on the grounds of
socioeconomic and territorial status, health status, and gender, which con
stituted a case of “overlapping,” “intersectional,” and “multiple”
discriminations.114 In a subsequent decision of 2016,115 the Committee con
demned Italy also for the violation of the right to work, and of the right of
dignity at work, on the grounds of the difference in treatment between
objecting and non objecting medical practitioners. In 2017, a heated debate
followed the decision of the Rome Region (where objecting personnel is more
than 90 percent) to set a public competition to select physicians for hire in
a major hospital. A prerequisite to access to the competition was a declaration
that they did not object to performing abortions. The regional authority
justified this decision on the ground that women’s right to health care could
not have been guaranteed under the current predicament.
Many countries have also experienced a multiplication of refusals to deliver
services and perform activities that do not imply direct participation in an
activity that the individual considers incompatible with his or her religion,
such as selling contraceptives, prescribing prenatal tests, providing reproduc
tive health related information, and so forth. The UK Supreme Court recently
ruled against the widening of conscientious objection to activities not directly
related to performing abortions in the Doogan case, which concerned the
claim by Catholic midwives employed as Labour Ward Coordinators who
objected to “delegating, supervising and/or supporting staff to participate in
and provide care to patients throughout the termination process.” The court
clarified that the words “to participate in” an abortion procedure mean “taking
part in a ‘hands on’ capacity” and do not extend to the managerial and super
visory tasks required of a Labour Ward Coordinator, which are administrative
in nature, and do not amount to taking part directly in the treatment bringing
about the termination of pregnancy.116
In the United States, following the Roe v.Wade decision, Congress adopted
the Church Amendment in 1973,117 which provided that receipt of federal
funds would not provide a basis for requiring a physician or nurse “to perform
or assist in the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if his
performance or assistance in the performance of such procedure or abortion
114 Ibid., para. 190.
115 Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy, Complaint no. 91/2013 (ECSR,
decision adopted and delivered on April 11, 2016).
116 Greater Glasgow Health Board (Appellant) v. Doogan and Another, at para. 38.
117 The Church Amendment was passed as part of the Health Programs Extension Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93–45, § 401(b)-(c), 87 Stat. 91, 95.
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would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions,”118 and that no
“entity” could be compelled to “make its facilities available for the perfor
mance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if [such] performance . . . is
prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral
convictions.”119 “In the 1990s and 2000s, laws at the state and federal levels
grew to include contraception and to cover a much broader range of acts and
actors. This new generation of laws went beyond the Church Amendment and
plainly sought to accommodate objections to many more forms of conduct,
interactions, and associations thought to make the objector complicit in the
wrongdoing of another person.”120 The escalation of religiously motivated
exemption claims reached its peak in 2014 with the Hobby Lobby case,121 in
which the claimants, closely held for profit corporations, objected to providing
their employees’ health insurance benefits that covered certain contraceptives
(such as the morning after pill and intrauterine devices that they deemed
“abortifacient”), under the Affordable Care Act. The latter, colloquially
known as “Obamacare,” mandated individual health insurance and employ
ers of a certain size to insure their employees as part of the employment
relationship. In particular, this insurance explicitly included an obligation to
offer contraceptive coverage to any woman who wished to avail herself of it.
This was an important change from the previous insurance arrangement that
often denied women the essentials of reproductive health coverage, which put
women at a disadvantage in obtaining equal access to health care. Obamacare
sought to remedy these deficiencies but immediately ignited a heated debate
that coalesced libertarian interests set against government intervention and
religious interests rigidly opposed to promotion of reproductive rights.
The Supreme Court upheld the claim by Hobby Lobby that offering to their
employees the required health care substantially burdened their free exercise
of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).122
The Court did however find that the employees would not lose their contra
ception coverage because the state itself could provide for it. Remarkably, as of
this writing, the Trump administration has proposed to expand the exemption
from contraceptive coverage in two essential ways. First, unlike the result in
the Hobby Lobby decision, the exemption would not allow women to get
alternative insurance coverage. Second, the exemption would extend not only
118 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(1) (2012). 119 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(2)(A) (2012).
120 Douglas NeJaime and Reva B. Siegel, “Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics,” Yale Law Journal 124 (2015): 2516–91, at 2538.
121 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
122 Religious FreedomRestoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488 (November 16,
1993).
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to religious but also to any moral objection asserted by the employer.
To buttress this expansion, the proposed rule insinuates that contraception is
not effective in preventing pregnancy and abortion for unmarried women and
that it fosters extramarital sex.123 As Priscilla Smith highlights, this is reminis
cent of the inclusion in an 1873 anti obscene literature bill of a ban on
contraceptive devices and abortifacients on the ground that “[w]here obscene
literature inflame desires, contraceptives and abortion enabled people to act
on their sexual desires and engage in sex while escaping the fear of procreation
and sexually transmitted diseases.”124
These developments indicate that the antiabortion movements do not in
fact pursue the reasonable accommodation of conscientious objectors, but an
incremental agenda, whereby each accommodation is a step further toward
the ultimate victory over reproductive rights. This agenda heavily interferes
with the democratic process by camouflaging policy objectives under indivi
dual claims of conscience. Thus, while traditional invocations of conscien
tious objection were aimed at protecting minority views andminority religious
practices, today religious exemptions in the field of reproductive rights are
overstretched and invoked to thwart the implementation of laws intended to
advance the equality of women, in the name of traditional religious views.
The latter often overlap with and reinforce a broader political agenda.
The controversy surrounding the adoption of Obamacare also suggests that
Hobby Lobby is part of a larger political strategy by social conservatives aimed
at preserving the traditional prejudice of conservative American politics
against government interventionism and socialized medicine.
In Russia, the introduction of a conscientious objection clause in Article 70
of the 2012 law, and its critical reception by the ROC, seems to suggest that
antiabortion activism foresees a similar incremental path as in the United
States. In fact whereas the RussianOrthodox Church’s strategy has been one of
influencing public policy in order to change the legal situation of abortion in
Russia, radical pro life civil society movements have mobilized to ban abor
tion in Russia altogether. In 2015/2016, the Orthodox Christian Association For
Life (Zazhizn’) launched a popular referendum to ban abortions completely.
The referendum gained little support among politicians, but gathered around
half a million signatures according to the organizers. In the pro life strategy of
Zazhizn’, the connection between fetus protective arguments and the cult of
123 “Proposed Rule Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act”
[Billing Codes: 4830–01-P; 4510–029-P; 4120–01-P; 6325–64], https://assets.documentcloud
.org/documents/3761268/Preventive-Services-Final-Rule-0.pdf (accessed June 6, 2017).
124 Ibid.
252 Susanna Mancini and Kristina Stoeckl
the Russian nation is apparent. Vladimir Potikha, at the time the vice pre
sident of the organization, has argued that the prohibition of abortion in
Russia should contribute to making Russia a great power again, much like
the Soviet Union in the past. For this purpose he even created an emblem
based on the state emblem of the Soviet Union, replacing the hammer and
sickle in the center with a baby inside a uterus, his organization’s symbol. He
explained that the slogan “Proletarians of the world unite” had a hidden
meaning, because the Latin term proles originally meant “offspring.”
Potikha glosses over the paradox that abortion in the Soviet Union was legal;
as a matter of fact, he blames the legalization of abortion in the Soviet Union
on “Jewish doctors” and hails the Stalinist period of criminalization of abor
tion as a successful project and as a response to eugenics in Nazi Germany.125
In short, the ideology fueling the pro life agenda of the organization Zazhizn’
is nationalist, Orthodox, and anti Semitic. These ingredients nationalism,
Orthodoxy, anti Semitism, and Stalinism are a common feature of the
Russian right.126
The Russian pro life movement looks attentively to the West and in parti
cular to the United States. Activists interviewed by us confirmed that already
during the 1990s there were contacts with pro life movements from the United
States, who shared informational material with them: “When we saw
pictures . . . from the United States [of aborted children], well, from the
American prolife movement, yes, we realized that . . . it is necessary to stop
the killing of children,” one interviewee said to us.127 Another interviewee
recalled that the two most influential pieces of information imported from the
United States in the early 1990s were the film Silent Scream (1984), for which
they acquired the rights and prepared a professional translation, and the
translation of the Handbook on Abortion (1971) by John C. Willke.128 This
activist explained that he has almost daily contacts with pro life organizations
in theWest, many of them connected with the Catholic Church, but also with
American Protestants and Anglicans. The Russian activists interviewed by us,
125 Vladimir V. Potikha, “Iz Istorii Prenatal’nogo Infantitsida: Vekhi I Daty Proshedshego
Stoletiya,” YouTube, March 2, 2017 (video uploaded by Festival Za Zhizn’,
registered January 27, 2017 in the context of the XXV Christmas Readings, Hotel Salyut,
Moscow, 2017).
126 Alexander Verkhovsky, “The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Nationalist,
Xenophobic and Antiwestern Tendencies in Russia Today: Not Nationalism, but
Fundamentalism,” Religion, State, and Society 30, no. 4 (2002): 333–45.
127 Person B, interview by Olena Kostenko, Moscow, January 2017 (conducted in the context of
the Project Postsecular Conflicts [PI Kristina Stoeckl], with a Russian pro-life activist).
128 Person A, interview by Olena Kostenko, Moscow, January 2017 (conducted in the context of
the Project Postsecular Conflicts [PI Kristina Stoeckl], with a Russian pro-life activist).
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who use the anglicized term “pro life” in Russian (pro lajf), freely admit to
obtaining and translating informational material from the West, and to dis
covering topics previously not in the focus of the Russian pro life movement,
for example the battle against contraceptives that are considered to have an
abortive effect. Russian pro life activists interpreted the election of Donald
Trump as president of the United States as an opportunity for antiabortionists
in Russia and worldwide. A few days after President Trump signed an execu
tive order on January 23, 2017, barring federal funds from organizations that
promote abortion around the world,129 including the International Planned
Parenthood Federation (the policy, known as the Mexico City Policy or the
Global Gag Rule, was ushered in under Ronald Reagan and bars federal funds
from going to foreign organizations that perform abortions overseas or lobby
for the practice’s legalization in other countries), one Russian activist was on
record as having expressed the hope that this act will have beneficial effects on
Russia, preventing “such organizations from destroying family values here in
Russia.” It was up to Russian pro life organizations, this activist concluded, to
fill the void left by no longer funded prochoice groups.130
Importantly, pro life activists in Russia do not feel that they have the Russian
government on their side; rather, they lobby and mobilize the public for their
ideas in order to force the government into action. Galina Semionova, who
directs a crisis center in Saint Petersburg, characterized her work as an “anti
state activity.”131However, they also feel in aminority position inside their own
society. One activist interviewed by us lamented the fact that an antiabortion
rally in Moscow collects no more than 2,000 to 3,000 people, whereas
the March for Life in Washington regularly gathers large support,132 and
another activist commented that Russian society was ready neither for
a complete prohibition of abortion nor for militant antiabortion actions as
common in the United States.133 As Luehrmann notices, Russian antiabortion
activists portray themselves as anti state as well as patriots “because of the
specific history of abortion and reproductive legislation in the Soviet
Union.”134 It also became apparent from our fieldwork that the Russian pro
life movement is divided in strategic terms, with one civil society branch
129 “Presidential Memorandum Regarding the Mexico City Policy,” www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-mexico-city-policy.
130 Sergey Chesnokov, “Sovremennaya Diskusiya,” YouTube March 2, 2017 (video uploaded by
Festival Za Zhizn’, registered January 27, 2017 in the context of the XXVChristmas Readings,
Hotel Salyut, Moscow, 2017).
131 Quoted by Luehrmann, “Innocence,” 103.
132 Person B, interview by Olena Kostenko, Moscow, January 2017.
133 Person A, interview by Olena Kostenko, Moscow, January 2017.
134 Luehrmann, “Innocence,” 104.
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aiming at maximalist solutions (like the complete ban on abortions), and
another branch, closely related to the Patriarchate of Moscow, more focused
on pastoral care, education, and legislative influence in small steps.
8.6 CONCLUSIONS: ANTIABORTION MEASURES “IN THE NAME
OF SOCIETY”
In this chapter, we have demonstrated parallelisms between and in some
places a direct influence of antiabortion arguments and strategies matured
in the United States and antiabortion debates in Europe and Russia. We have
made a distinction between fetus centered, women centered, and society
centered strategies and have shown that arguments against abortion in the
name of society as a whole are gaining increasing appeal across all three
regions. In Russia, in particular, society centered arguments have been
reshaped against the backdrop of the collective trauma resulting from Soviet
abortion practices. Hence, while in Western democracies the focus of abor
tion discourses has traditionally been the individual, in Russia the question of
abortion structurally acquires a collective dimension. This collective appeal
has been heavily reinforced by the demographic preoccupations raised by the
Russian government and the ROC following the collapse of the USSR. Thus,
in Russia, antiabortion arguments translate predominantly into society
protective arguments, even if they are articulated in terms of fetuses’ rights
or women’s health. Echoes of the society protective antiabortion arguments
are increasingly perceivable in the contemporary Western debate. They con
stitute, on one hand, an evolution of fetus and women protective justifications
for restricting reproductive choices. In the United States, they thus represent
a further step of escalation in the ongoing culture wars that are characteristic of
an American society heavily divided over moral issues. On the other hand,
society protective arguments may be gaining global appeal precisely through
the persuasiveness they have acquired in the Russian context and, for that
matter, all over Central and Eastern Europe. The political rhetoric of defend
ing traditional values and the natural family are at the heart of an organization
like the WCF or the ecumenical contacts of the ROC. The global activism of
these actors spreads the message beyond narrow circles of pro life activists and
church leaders and contributes to raising the stakes in the transatlantic and
transnational antiabortion discourse.
The evidence presented here suggests that, on the question of abortion,
reasonable accommodation may reach its limits. Antiabortion movements
pursue an incremental agenda, whereby each accommodation is a step further
toward the ultimate victory over reproductive rights. The venues for this
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agenda are multifold: political parties, national governments, national and
international courts, transnational civil society. Antiabortion activism thereby
indicates a broader trend in the politicization of social conservative values: in
liberal democratic societies claims based on morality and conscience will
usually find reasonable accommodation through the instrument of legal exemp
tions. The abortion debate is one instance of such claims where social con
servatives no longer merely want to be accommodated by the legal system; they
want to give shape to it.135 In countries where antiabortionists do not achieve this
goal through majoritarian political means (by being voted into political posi
tions that would allow them to pursue their program), they pursue their policy
objectives in a way that thwarts the implementation of laws, that is, through
mass objection to abortion and through the extension of conscientious objection
and religious exemptions to arenas that no longer represent a close and direct
nexus between the objector and the objected action, such as refusal to pay for
health services in theHobby Lobby case and in recent policy proposals in Russia.
Disagreement over fundamental moral and religious questions is an inevi
table feature of modern pluralistic societies. Indeed, robust disagreement that
forces opponents to make compromises is a motor for democratic politics.
If we look at the evolution of antiabortion arguments as described in this
chapter through the lens of Habermas’s theory of a “post secular society,” what
strikes us is that today’s society centered antiabortion strategies appear ever less
conducive to the “complementary learning process” envisioned by the
German philosopher and thus to compromise.136 In the past, fetus and
women protective arguments may have served as correctives in debates over
reproductive rights. When abortion was decriminalized in Western Europe
and in the United States in the 1970s against the opposition of the Catholic
Church and of conservative social actors, the compromise found pitting
women’s rights against the interests of the fetus proved remarkably durable.
This compromise is objectionable on many levels: first, it prioritizes privacy
over equality and, second, it seems to privilege the physician’s expertise over
the woman’s autonomy.137 In spite of all its shortcomings, on pragmatic
grounds, this compromise remains preferable to the new lines of argumenta
tion that are bent on quashing all conflicts of rights in the name of society.
135 Kristina Stoeckl, “Political Liberalism and Religious Claims: Four Blind Spots,” Philosophy
and Social Criticism 43, no. 1 (2017): 34–50.
136 Ju¨rgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” European Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 14
(2006): 1–25.
137 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade,” North Carolina Law Review 63, no. 2 (1985): 375–86, and Catharine Mackinnon,
“Reflections on Sex Equality under Law,” Yale Law Journal 100, no. 5 (1991): 1281–328.
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The “conflict of rights” model de facto left space for the expression and
interaction between a plurality of views, whereas the new rhetoric in effect
cuts off all discussion and imposes a unidimensional ideological and political
point of view.
The compromises that matured out of heavy controversy decades ago seem
at risk today. Society protective strategies that rely on overstretched conscien
tious objection claims no longer aim at finding rules valid for all, which
everybody can more or less live with, but rather desire purity for a selected
group of people at the expense of access to rights for others. In this sense,
society centered arguments are profoundly divisive: they divide hospitals,
communities, and entire populations into those who consciously object and
those who do not. Furthermore, they construct an enemy (the “culture of
death”) where, in reality, we have conflicting claims that should be handled,
with responsibility and reasonability, in the light of the fact that in complex
societies complete partisan victories are unattainable and ultimately undesir
able. Legal exemptions for conscientious objectors are a last resort of accom
modation of divergent views in pluralistic democratic societies. If they become
majoritarian, as in the case of some regions of Italy, or if they extend to causes
such as paying taxes, as in the case of American or Russian debates, they
become democratically problematic. The criteria for granting such exemp
tions must therefore be handled with care.
Opposition to abortion and contraception has become a standard feature of
right wing populist political agendas across Europe and the United States.
It frequently comes with advocating for isolationism, nationalism, anti
immigration policies, and cultural protectionism. The Trump administration
provides a salient example of this new ideological campaign, by combining
the dismantling of the mainstays of reproductive freedom with xenophobic
and Islamophobic language and immigration measures. The antiabortionists’
dream, just like the populist dream, is a self selected purity in a world they
divide between “us” and “them.” For liberal democracies, this aspiration,
which is fueled by transnational activism and shared arguments and strategies
across countries, constitutes a major challenge.
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